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Abstract 
The need to balance the needs and rights of all parties is a central consideration in 
legal procedure. This is no simple task, however, when the interests of the defendant are 
often in direct contrast to those of the witness. Much of the contention arises from the 
ambiguity associated with the nature ofboth victims' and defendants' rights and the lack 
of clear guidelines for the resolution of conflict where such competing interests are 
involved. Because Australia has no document precisely delineating the nature and 
content of individual rights, the result is a reliance on an ill-defined combination of 
common law practice, conceptions of both natural rights and utilitarianism, 
international human rights agreements and legislative stipulations. 
In recent times, attention has been focused on the perceived inadequacies of 
legislation pertaining to the child witness in a criminal trial. There is considerable 
contemporary e:idence to suggest that the traditional justifications given to regulate the 
reception of children's evidence in courts of law were based on unsubstantiated notions 
of the inherent unreliability of children. The need to introduce legislative refonn 
pertaining to the evidence of children was first articulated by the Child Sexual Abuse 
Task Force which finalised its report to the Western Australian government in 1987. In 
Aprill991, the Law Refonn Commission of Western Australia published their Report 
on Evideoce of Children and Other Vulnemble Witnesses, having been asked to review 
the law and pmctice governing the giving of such evidence in legal proceedings. Their 
recommendations formed the basis for the Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children und 
Others) Act 1992. 
iii 
Although there is widespread support for the introduction of measures to address 
the needs of the child witness, there does not appear to have been sufficient rigorous 
evaluation of the corresponding effect on defendants' rights, particularly the right to a 
fair trial. This right, although not protected or defined by statute, is recognised both in 
Australia's common law heritage and through our ratification of major international 
human rights agreements. Although there is a general acceptance that the right to a fair 
trial largely overrides other individual claims to rights within the trial setting, an 
important consideration is the inherent vulnerability of common law rights to abrogation 
or removal by statutory law. Similarly, international human rights agreements are not, 
of themselves, always adequately enforceable, and require the enactment of supportive 
domestic legislation to ensure that their provisions are upheld. This has not occurred in 
Australia to any great extent. 
The primacy of the right to a fair trial is not supported by the Acts Amer.dment 
(Evidence ofChi/dren and Others Ac(! 1992. Whilst some of the provisions of this Act, 
such as the amendments relating to competence and corroboration of evidence, have 
. 
brought children onto equal footing with other (adult) witnesses, other provisions have 
encroached on the defendant's right to a fair trial. Of particular concern are the subtle 
erosion of the presumption of innocence, the effects on the ability of the defence to 
cross-examine witnesses effectively, and the widespread inequality which the defendant 
now suffers in contrast to other defendants whose alleged offences do not come under 
the auspices of the Act: Although in drafting the legislation some care was taken to 
address these concerns, there still exists a degree of incompatibility between the Acts 
Amendment (Evidence of Children and Others) Act 1992 and defendants' rights. 
Safeguards for the protection of defendants' rights contained in the Act are, at times, 
irr.;ufficient. 
iv 
The precise extent to which the provisions ofthe Acts Amendment (Evidence of 
Children ond Others) Act 1992 encroach on the conception of trial fairness is difficult 
to ascertain, thus the current research has highlighted only those provisions of the Act 
which are potentially incompatible with defendants' rights. Future research must 
stringently investigate the actual (not perceived) impact of these provisions on all 
parties to the proceedings, including the defendan~ the child, defence and prosecution 
lawyers, judicial officers and jurors. Subsequent to this investigation, a re~evaluation 
of the legitimacy of the legislation may be required. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A central consideration in legal procedure in Western legal jurisdictions is the need 
to balance the rights, responsibilities and obligations of all parties involved (Carmichael 
& Sarre, 1994, p. 119; Harrison, 1992). This is surely no easy task in a criminal trial 
where the interests of the defendant are often in direct competition with those of the 
victim or witness. In recent years, increasing attention has focused upon the particular 
needs of the child witness, culminating in a number of amendments to both the trial 
process and various aspects of the law of evidence, the aim of which is to facilitate the 
reception of children's evidence. Although in calling for legislative change the Law 
Refonn Commission of Western Australia explicitly acknowledged the right of the 
defendant to a fair trial (1991, p. 60), their assertions that the (then) proposed 
amendments- which fonn the basis of the Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children and 
Others) Act 1992 (in future, referred to as "The Act")- do not impinge on this right, 
appear to require more stringent evaluation. In seeking to accommodate the needs and 
rights of the child witness in a criminal trial, it is possible that the legitimate rights of 
the defendant have been compromised. The Act has perceptibly shifted the balance of 
competing interests in a criminal trial, and it is the redefining of the relationship 
between these interests which is of concern in this thesis. 
Although it was asserted in Parliament prior to the enactment of The Act that 
"Particular care has also been taken in drafting the bill to ensure that accused persons 
retain their rights, particularly the right to a fair trial" (Berinson, 1992, p. 15), it will be 
argued that there are a number of specific concerns which have not been rigorously 
evaluated. Thus the aim of this study is to investigate whether or not there exists a 
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degree of incompatibility between The Act and defendants' rights. This will be achieved 
by addressing the following questions: 
• What specific rights are held by the defendant in a criminal trial? 
• Are any of the provisions of the Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children and 
Others) Act /992 at least potentially inconsistent with the upholding of these 
rig)lf~? 
• If so, how may the areas of incompatibility be resolved or, at least, minimised? 
These questions will be addressed through the applicatim .ae principles of 
logical reasoning to the analysis of potential incompatibilities between The Act and 
defendants' rights. The premises for this argument will be established through a detailed 
examination of both the literature on rights and the law as it stands. It is reasonable to 
assume, therefore, that tl1e persuasiveness of the argument will rest substantially on the 
degree to which these premises may be established as true. It may be considered a 
limitation that, in this purely conceptual research endeavour, undertaken in a 
contentious field replete with conflicting ideas, values and opinions, 11truth 11 may be 
perceived as an elusive quality. Furthennore, logical analysis can reach conclusions that 
are intuitively uncomfortable, yet, as noted by Bates ( 1992), "the very subject of child 
sexual abuse has, probably inevitably, spawned entrenched and intractable points of 
view which, in tum, tend to obfuscate the realities of the situation". 
Background oftbe Law of Evidence 
"The evidence of a fact is that which tends to prove it - something which may 
satisfY an inquirer that the fact exists" (Byrne and Heydon, 1991, p. 1). Thus the law of 
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evidence is the body of rules which regulates the presentation of evidence in conrts of 
law, ensuring that the evidence introduced is relevant to the proof of the facts in 
question. Specifically, the law of evidence governs what evidence may be presented to 
the court, who may give evidence, and how the evidence may be presented. Since the 
court's decision is based solely on the admitted evidence, and because any given case 
may be dependent upon whether or not a particular item of evidence may be presented 
to the court, it is obvious that the law of evidence is a potentially decisive factor in 
determining the trial outcome. 
The three main influences on the development of the law of evidence to its 
contemporruy form are the jwy, the oath and the adversary system. Initially, juries were 
• > 
comprised of a group of the defendant's neighbours, whose collective opinion decided 
guilt or innocence. There was little or no reliance on unbiased factual evidence, with 
jurymen being those who might, by virtue oftheir proximity, have some knowledge of 
the event in question. Thus jurymen were also the earliest fonn of witnesses (Stone & 
Wells, 1991, pp. 16-18). 
The transition of the jwy from neighbours to independent individuals probably 
began when more than one issue had to be decided at trial: Those neighbours who might 
know of the circumstances of one issue (for example, a rape) may have no knowledge 
of another (fur example, the privilege of clergy which - at that time - may have afforded 
the accused exemption from prosecution). Such circumstances would, therefore, have 
necessitated the fonnation of more than one jury (Stone & Wells, 1991, pp. 18-19). 
Expediency gradually separated the responsibilities of witness and jury, with evidence 
from witnesses being presented before an independent jury. 
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An oath was originally sworn to invoke divine intervention. With the inclusion of 
witnesses and the provision of evidence in trials, individuals had to swear an oath on the 
Gospel, the intention being that such an oath would be binding on the individual's 
conscience. Although the right to take the oath - and therefore to give evidence - was 
originally limited to Christians, amendments have gradually introduced a variety of 
alternatives which enable people of other religions to swear an oath in a manner 
compliant with their religious beliefs (Australian Law Reform Commission [ALRC], 
1982, pp. 1-8). For those who hold no religious belief, evidence may be given upon 
making a solemn affirmation (Evidence Act 1906 [WA], s. 7). Clearly these 
developments have greatly influenced the diversity of people who are deemed 
competent to give evidence at trial. 
The adversary system developed from the ancient tradition of trial by battle, where 
the parties to a dispute would engage in physical combat to decide the winner (and thus 
the person in the right). Today the 'battle' is conducted in coutt, where both parties (or 
their legal representatives) contend, puTSuant to the rules of evidence. At common law, 
the parties to the dispute conduct their own case: the responsibility ofthe judge and/or 
jury is to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented to them - there is no 
allowance made for the court to seek additional evidence. It is, however, a reasonable 
assumption that those parties directly involved in the proceedings, therefore having the 
greatest interest in the outcome, are most likely to identifY and present the most relevant 
evidence in support of their particular claims (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 33). 
There are two fundamental conceptions underpinning the law of evidence. Firstly, 
a court is not to consider information or evidence unless it is probative of the material 
facts; and secondly, that "unless excluded by some rule or principle oflaw, all that is 
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logically probative is admissible" (Thayer, 1898, p. 266). Evidential rules are, however, 
largely rules of exclusion (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 43; Bates, 1985, p. 14) and relevant 
evidence may be deemed inadmissible (Byrne & Heydon, 1986, p. 85; Cross & Wilkins, 
1986). The predominant justification for such exclusions is the perceived necessity to 
protect lay juries from the "dangers of confusion and prejudice" (Stone & Wells, 1991, 
p. 55) associated with the reception of all but the most reliable and cogent - as well as 
logically probative - evidence. The exclusion of evidence more prejudicial than 
probative is, therefore, a direct acknowledgment of the right of the defendant to a fair 
trial (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 49). 
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CHAPTER ONE: HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION 
The Traditional Approach to Children's Evidence 
One area in which the rules of evidentiary exclusion have bad a substantial impact 
is in respect to the evidence of children. The law has traditionally regarded children as 
a special class of persons, requiring both special protective measures (for example, 
freedom from criminal responsibility) and unique restrictions against their involvement 
in certain activities (such as the prohibition against driving until the age of 17) 1 Law 
Reform Commission of Western Australia [LRCWA], 1990, p. 6). In court, childrtn 
have been traditionally regarded as unreliable witnesses, and it is this notion of inherent 
unreliability which was the principle justification for the established rules of 
competence which, until recently, largely precluded their testimony (Warner, 1988; 
1991). 
At common law, there exists no fonnal test of competence to give evidence beyond 
the under.;tanding of the oath (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 3~3). Although in English law it is 
not necessary for a child to believe in God for him or her to be deemed able to 
understand the nature of the oath, in Western Australia the common law test for 
competency to take the oath had been more strictly construed than the other States, as 
it incorpomted the notion of religious understanding (LRCW A, 1990, pp. 17-18). Such 
stringent reliance upon the understanding of the oath is now, however, widely regarded 
as both unrealistic and unfair, because it meant that if a child was unable to understand 
or adequately describe the concept of divine retribution or the significance of taking an 
oath on the Bible, they were unable to give evidence on oath (Byrne, 1991, p. 12). "This 
is not a test which a very young child, however intelligent and truthful, may be expected 
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to pass ... [nor is it] a test which, when strictly interpreted, can properly he applied to 
a child who has not had any religious training" (LRCWA, 1990, p. 8). 
Also at common law, there exists a requirement that a child's evidence - like that 
of all other witnesses - he given on oath. Coupled with the stringent competency test, 
the result was largely the exclusion of children's evidence. Gradually, however, 
Australian jurisdictions, together with those of many other common law countries, have 
modified this standard, allowing children to give unsworn evidence where they are 
deemed unfit to take the oath (LRCWA, 1990, p. 17). The new standard for unsworn 
evidence required that the court he satisfied that the child witness had the capacity to 
give rational evidence, that they could demonstrate an understanding of the moral duty 
to tell the truth, and they were adjudicated as being likely to tell the truth (Ligertwood, 
1993, p. 363; LRCWA, 1990, p. 8). In Western Australia, this was dealt with under 
section 101 of the Evidence Acti906 (since repealed) (Appendix 1). 
As noted in seetion 101(2), the Evidence Ac/1906 prior to amendment contained 
the express provision that no person could be convicted of a crime or misdemeanour on 
the unsworn testimony of r1 child unless the testimony was corroborated by other 
evidence. Corroboration is independent evidence which otherwise tends to establish that 
the offi:nce in question was committed, and also that it was committed by the defendant 
(Byrne & Heydon, 1991, pp. 12-13). The corroboration requirement attached to 
children's evidence acted as an exception to the general rule that the uncorroborated 
evidence of one witness was sufficient in order to obtain a conviction (LRCW A, 1990, 
p. 19). 
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At this point it may be pertinent to distinguish who precisely is considered to be a 
child under Western Australian law. Although at common law those under the age of 
majority (that is, 18 years) are liable to assessment for competence to take the oath, 
section I 0 I of the Evidence Act 1906 (since repealed) referred only to children under 
the age of 12 years. For all practical purposes, therefore, children 12 years and over are 
presumed competent to take the oath in the same manner as adults. Furthermore, the 
corroboration requirements related to the unsworn testimony of children do not apply 
to the unsworn testimony ofthose over the age of 12 years (LRCWA, 1990, pp. 6-7). 
At common law, there was a rule of practice that, even when a child gives sworn 
testimony, the trial judge should warn the jury that, although they may permissibly 
choose to convict the accused it would be dangerous to do so in the absence of 
corroborative evidence (Warner, 1991, p. 170). Thus even when permitted to give 
evidence, whether by sworn or unsworn testimony, children1s evidence had retained the 
stigma of unreliability. 
The Argument for Legislative Reform 
The need for legislative reform in this state was first officially articulated by the 
Child Sexual Abuse Task Force which finalised its report to the Western Australian 
government in 1987. This Task Force recognised the need to minimise, as far as 
possible, the negative impact oflegal proceedings on the child. In all, 17 of their 64 
recommendations dealt with proposed amendments to legal proceedings (Manley & 
Bellett, 1994). 
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The Task Force concluded that ''the law regarding the evidence of children presents 
difficulties in cases of child sexual abuse, since very often there is no physical evidence 
of the abuse, and it is frequently difficult to present other evidence that corrobomtes a 
child victim's testimony" (cited in LRCWA. 1990, p. 3). They asserted that, among the 
obstacles to successful prosecution in cases of child sexual abuse, certain aspects of the 
' 
law of evidence were paramount. 
Among their concerns were: 
• The inability to obtain a conviction on the unsworn, unsubstantiated evidence of 
a child under 12 years; 
• The requirement that drildren must give evidence in open court, in the presence of 
the accused; and 
• The additional requirements imposed on children, but not adults, who wish to give 
unsworn testimony (that is, that they be "possessed of sufficient intelligence" to 
justifY reception of the evidence-s. 101 Evidence Ac/1906). 
(LRCWA, 1990, pp. 3-4). 
In April1990, the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia published their 
Discussion Paper on Evidence of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses, having 
been asked to review the law and practice governing the giving of such evidence in legal 
proceedings. They specified that the incentive for the review had arisen largely from the 
growth in public awareness of, and concern about, the sexual abuse of children (p. 3). 
The report drew on a growing body of psychological literature which challenged 
the basic assumptions which regulated legal pmctice involving the reception of 
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children's evidence. It had tmditionally been accepted that children's evidence could not 
be relied upon because: 
• children have no sense of ethical responsibility and are therefore inclined to tell 
lies; 
• children have difficulty differentiating reality from fantasy; and 
• children do not have adequate cogoitive skills to either understand or accurately 
describe what happened 
(LRCW A, 1990, p. 9). 
These concerns are not validated by more recent psychological litemtore. 
Contemporary evidence suggests that children are no more likely to be dishonest than 
adults, and when they do tell lies, it is for the same reasons as adults - reasons which 
include the avoidance of punishment or embarrassmen~ the protection of a loved one, 
and as a 'social grace' (Flin & Spencer, 1995; Dixon, 1994b; Scutt, 1991). With 
particular regard to child sexual abuse, it is claimed that demonstrable lying is very rare 
- probably lower than for adult witnesses (Bussey, 1992, p. 69). Sexoal contact is 
considered unlikely to figure in children's fantasies (LRCWA, 1990, p. 10) and, 
similarly, the fabrication of sexual encounters is postulated as unlikely, because these 
are believed to be beyond a child's expected levels of maturity and experience (Brennan, 
1993). 
There is now general agreement among child psychologists and psychiatrists that 
the accumcy of recall of children is probably at least as good as that of adults, although 
older children and adults will remember for longer and in more detail (LRCW A, 1990, 
p. 10; Foulsham, 1991, p. 215; Davies & Brown, 1978). The age effects are most 
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noticeable when the memory test is free recall rather than prompted recall (Flin & 
Spencer, 1995, p. 179), which has resulted in suggestions that the types of questions 
asked of child witnesses, and the form of testimony required of them, is a more 
important consideration in terms of the quality of their evidence than is the issue of 
memory itself. Thus it has been asserted that judges, magistrates, lawyers and police 
prosecutors involved in cases involving child witnesses should receive special training 
in the social, physiological and cognitive development of children (Scudds, 1991, p. 87), 
even to the point of developing a legal subspecialty in this area (Oates and Tong, 1987). 
If, as has been suggested (Warner, 1991, p. 170), even young children are able to 
provide reliable testimony if questions are appropriately tailored to their level of 
cognitive development, then greater understanding of the strengths and weakoesses of 
children's intellectual abilities "should assist the interviewers in adopting an effective 
technique- one which will enable the child to share their memories without diminishing 
the evidential value of the interview" (Flin & Spencer, 1995, p. 186). 
In light of these developments, the corroboration requirement imposed on the 
testimony of younger children must be viewed as indicative of the basic distrust with 
which the court regards all unsworn evidence - but more particularly that of a child. An 
important result of this distrllst is a general belief that corroborative evidence cannot 
take the form of further (independent) unsworn testimony. The consequence of this 
belief is "that, even in a case where there may be a large number of witnesses, if those 
witnesses are all children judged unable to take the oath ... then no conviction will 
follow unless there is other independent sworn evidence implicating the alleged 
offender" (LRCWA, 1990, pp. 8-9). The apparently consistent recall of a number of 
children is considered to be no different than one child's recollection. 
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This is particularly pertinent when you ccnsider that children are most often called 
to give evidence with regard to their own experience as victims (ALRC, 1992, p. !).In 
cases of child sexual abuse, for example, the corrobomtion requirement has been 
described as presenting a "formidable" (Davies, 1993, p. 284), if not virtually 
"insurmountable" (Scutt, 1991, p. 130) difficulty for successful prosecution. Abusive 
acts are frequently conducted in private with no witnesses other than the victim, leave 
no medical evidence or produce inconclusive clinical findings, and the alleged 
perpetrator denies any wrongdoing (Davies, 1993, p. 284; Harrison, 1992, p. 30; Scutt, 
1991, p. 130). Thus, if corroborative evidence was not available, legal proceedings were 
rarely commenced (Warner, 1991, p. 171). Because of this," ... it is argued that a 
corroboration requirement unduly discriminates against the testimony of children and 
thereby effectively prevents the conviction of persons who have committed offences 
against children" (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 360). 
This is obviously far from ideal. Although it is unacceptable in light of current 
knowledge to brand children's evidence inherently unreliable, however, it is equally 
unacceptable to proceed on the assumption that all children's evidence is credible and 
reliable (Carmichael & Sarre, 1994, p. 118). The focus needs to be on the evaluation of 
the individual child witness, rather than on children as a class of witness. The aspects 
of The Act which facilitate this individual assessment are, therefure, seemingly 
justified. Rather than creating special provision for hearing the evidence of children, 
these reforms bring children on to equal footing with other witnesses. This may 
facilitate the reception of their evidence, however the effect on the rights of the 
defendant are seemingly minimal. 
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The second express concern voiced by the Law Refonn Commission was the need 
to alleviate, or at least minimise, trauma for the child witness. There is a limited amount 
of research pertaining to the psychological effects experienced by witnesses due to their 
involvement in a criminal investigation and trial (Fiin, 1990, p. 275). However, it is 
generally accepted that involvement in legal proceedings can be traumatic to a child, 
inhibiting their testimony or possibly even contributing to a false retraction or refusal 
to testifY at all (Warner, 1988). High levels of anxiety are not conducive to effective 
testimony in either children or adults (Davies, 1993), and although the specific impact 
of stress and anxiety on witnesses' ability to recall and recount events is somewhat 
uncertain, there is abundant anecdotal evidence to the effect that witnesses believe that 
the quality of their evidence was negatively affected by the anxiety they experienced in 
the witness box (Fiin, 1990, p. 277). 
Introduction of Tbe Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children and Others) Actl992 
In November 1992, legislation was enacted in the form of the Acts Amendment 
(Evidence of Children and Others) Act 1992 (Appendix 2). The stated intention of this 
legislation was to address some of the difficulties encountered by children, and other 
witnesses designated as particularly vulnerable, when giving evidence (Berinson, 1992, 
p. 15). The major provisions of this legislation to be discussed here are as follows: 
• Section I OOA, allowing the unsworn evidence of a person not competent to take 
the oath or swear their solemn affirmation, was amended to specifically include a 
child who is of or over the age of 12 years. 
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• Section 101 of the Evidence Act/906 was repealed. The most significant feature 
of this is the abolition of the mandatory statutory requirement that the unsworn 
evidence of a child under 12 years must be corroborated in order to obtain a 
conviction. 
• By the insertion of section 106B, children aged under 12 years are deemed 
competent to give sworn evidence if, in the opinion of the court, the child 
understands that -
(a) the giving of evidence is a serious matter; and 
(b) he or she in giving evidence has an obligation to tell the truth that is over 
and above the ordinary duty to tell the truth. 
This removed the requirement that a child must believe in God or in a divine sanction 
for telling a lie. Furthermore, this section permits a child who is competent to take the 
oath, but does not wish to do so, to make a solemn affirmation in the same way as an 
adult. 
• Section 106C permits a child under 12 to give unsworn evidence if he or she does 
not appear to understand that 'the giving of evidence is a serious matter and/or the 
special obligation to tell the truth in giving evidence (which were the previous 
requirements under section 101 ). The main criteria is that the child is able to give 
an intelligible account of events which he or she has observed or experienced. 
Thus very young children are now able to provide testimony. 
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• Section I 060 explicitly precludes a corrobomtion warning being given to the jury 
solely on the basis that the witness whose evidence is uncorrobomted is a child, 
whether that evidence be sworn or unsworn. The "age of the witness should not be 
a basis for comment as this may imply that child witnesses are inherently less 
trustworthy or reliable than other witnesses" (Dixon, 1994a). However, this does 
not override the authority of the court to issue such a warning where, with regard 
to the evidence of a particular individual, there is considered an appropriate need 
for a warning to be issued on other grounds. 
• Child witnesses aged under 16 years now have the right to have a support person 
seated near them throughout the trial. This person must be approved by the court, 
and must not be a witness in, or party to, the proceedings (s. 106E); 
• Counsel may seek the assistance of an appropriately qualified person in 
communicating with a child witness who may have difficulty in understanding 
questions or in framing answers which satisfY the questioner (s. 106F). The 
function of this person is, if requested by the judge, to communicate and explain 
to the child the questions put to the child, and to communicate and to explain to the 
court the evidence given by the child. 
Any person appointed under this section must take an oath, or make a declamtion in 
such form as the Court sees fi~ that they will perform their duties "faithfully". If, in the 
course of their duties, they wilfully make any false or misleading statements- either to 
the child or to the court - they commit an indictable offence. 
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• Under section 106G, an unrepresented accused- one who has not engaged the 
services oflegal counsel - may not directly cross-examine a child witness under the 
age of 16. Instead, all questions must be put to the child through an intermediary. 
This intermediary will be either the judge, or another person approved by the court, 
and questions must be repeated accurately to the child. 
It is believed that this will facilitate the child giving evidence by reducing any perceived 
threat the child may feel in the presence of the accused. 
Further provisions apply in Schedule 7 proceedings. In addition to applications for 
care and protection orders under the Child Welfare Act 1947, Schedule 7 proceedings 
inCOJ]JOmte a variety of criminal hearings relating primarily to alleged sexual offences 
or other offences causing physical harm (Appendix 3). These provisions are usually 
justified on the basis of the need to reduce the trauma associated with both face-to-face 
confrontation with the defendant, and with telling embarrassing stories in the 
"intimidating atmosphere of a traditional courtroom" (Dixon, 1994a). The provisions 
include: 
• Under section 106H, the admissibility of certain out-of-court statements deemed 
"relevant" to the proceeding, which were made by the child to another person prior 
to the proceedings being commenced. The defendant must be provided with a copy 
of the statement if recorded, otherwise with full details of the statement, and the 
child must be available for cross-examination. 
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• Sections I 06I - I 06M allow for the admission of video-taped statements, video-
recorded evidence in chief and/or video-recorded evidence taken at a pre-trial 
hearing. 
• Section 1 06N provides for the utilisation of closed-circuit television or screening 
arrangements as a standard requiremen~ unless the trial judge is satisfied that the 
child witness is able, and wishes, to give evidence in the courtroom in the presence 
of the defendant. Thus the child does not have to be in the presence of the accused 
(in the case of closed-circuit TV) or in view of the accused (when CCTV is 
unavailable). The child must remain visible to the court- specifically to the parties 
involved and to the jury- throughout their testimony. 
There is an additional requirement under section 106P of The Act that the judge in a 
jury trial must instruct the jury that the procedure involving use of CCTV is a routine 
one, and they are not to draw any inference from it as to the defendanfs guilt or 
mnocence. 
The Act also makes provision for a person other than a child to he designated as 
a spetial witness, giving them access to a support person and to the use of video--
recorded evidence and closed-circuit television. 
Although there is widespread support for the introduction of such measures to 
address the needs of the child witness (Dixon, 1994a; LRCWA, 1991; Flin, I990), it 
does not appear that snfficiently rigorous evaluation has been given to the corresponding 
effect on defendants' rights. It will he argued that it is the measures introduced to reduce 
the trauma associated with involvement in the trial process which are the most 
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controversial in tenns of their incompatibility with the rights of the defendant. Although 
the traditional treatment of children as a "special class" of persons under the law has 
already been acknowledged, a central consideration in this instance is whether, in so 
doing, we create a "special class" of defendant whose rights receive less consideration 
than a defendant facing different criminal charges. 
Whilst cross.,jurisdictional comparisons are always difficul~ similar legislative 
reforms in other jurisdictions have been criticised on a number of grounds. In the United 
States, for example, where individual rights are clearly delineated in the Constitution, 
a special provision enacted in the state of Texas to admit the videotaped testimony of 
a child under the age of thirteen was held to be unconstitutional on the basis that it 
infringed the constitutional right to due process (Warner, !988). Similarly, the use of 
screening techniques and dosed-circuit television have been successfully contested as 
infringing a defendanfs Sixth Amendment right to confront their accuser (Coy v. Iowa, 
487 U.S. I 012 (1988)). By contrast, in the United Kingdom support has been generated 
for the view that there is no absolute right to face-to-face confrontation. In the case of 
Smellie v. R ([1919]14 Cr App R 128), where the defendant was removed from the 
courtroom while his daughter gave evidence, an appeal based on the (alleged) common 
Jaw right to "be within sight and hearing of all the witnesses throughout his trial" was 
dismissed. As the United Kingdom has been instrumental in providing Australia with 
a constitutional"model" since white sett1ement, and since neither England nor Australia 
recognise a constitutional right to confrontation, the considemtions raised in these 
countries are bound to ditrer from those in the United States (Cashmore, 1990). 
Current arguments which seek to downplay the effect of Western Australian 
legislative reform on the rights of the defendant are often far from compelling. For 
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example, section 635 of The Criminal Code [WA] specifies that criminal trials must 
take place in the presence of the pell!Ons accused unless, by their conduct (tor esample, 
continued interruptions), they render continuation ofthe proceedings in their presence 
impracticable. Claims such as that offered by the Law Refonn Commission of Western 
Australia (1991, p. 67) that Section 635 cannot be held as an "insuperable objection" to 
the use of closed circuit television because this medium was unforeseeable when the 
legislation was enacted are not sufficiently convincing to justifY the overriding of 
accepted practice without more stringent or reasoned argument. Whilst there is no 
question that modem technological advancement has exceeded all expectations of the 
legislators responsible for the original statute, mere availability of technology is not 
always sufficient grounds to warrant its utilisation. 
Much of the contention arises from the ambiguity associated with the nature of 
defendants' rights, and the lack of clear guidelines for the resolution of conflict where 
competing interests are involved. Australian jurisdictions have no document or charter 
which clearly specifies the precise nature of the rights of the criminal defendant, mther 
we are dependent on a somewhat piecemeal concoction of common law practice, 
conceptions of nature! law and nature! rights, rights created or reinforced through the 
ratification of various treaties (although these are not automatically legally enforceable) 
and legislative stipulations. Until a clear delineation of defendants' rights is established, 
we have no basis from which to evaluate the legitimacy oflegislative refonn. 
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CHAPTER TWO- THE NOTION OF RIGHTS 
The tenn "human rights"- which replaces what were fonnerly referred to as the 
"rights of man" or, at an earlier time, "natural rights" (Cranston, 1983)- is commonly 
heard in modem society. Despite frequent exhortations to the notion of rights, there 
appears little agreemen~ either today or historically, as to the precise definition of what 
a right actually is. Accordingly, in discussing the (alleged) human right to privacy, 
Wellman (1978, p. 368) mises three philosophical questions equally applicable to any 
human right: firstly, how do we know that there really is such a human right; secondly, 
assuming that the right exists, what duties or obligations does it imply; and finally, 
precisely how is the content of the right to be defined? 
Natuml rights theorists propound the existence of rights, common to all people, 
which are inherent in, and integml to, human existence. In the 17th centwy, for 
example, Locke promoted a conception ofnatumllaw based on three propositions: that 
the natural order of the universe was ordained by God; that, through the use of reason, 
man is able to discover the valid and objective rules of conduct which were prescribed 
by God; and that these rules can be known with certainty (Cranston, 1983). Locke 
(1690) also argued that men were equally entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges of 
the law of nature, specifically the natural right to life, liberty and estate (property). 
Natuml rights philosophy has been undeniably influential in motivating political 
action. The Bill of Rights enacted by the English Parliament in 1689 translated the 
natural rights espoused by Locke into positive legal rights, incorpomting (among other 
tltings) the right for any person charged with a criminal offence to a fair and public trial 
bY jury (Cmnston, 1983), which had been acknowledged since the Magna Carta. Claims 
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in the preamble to the 1776 American Declaration of Independence that it is "self-
evident that all men are created equal [and] that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain inalienable rights" and the assertions in the 1789 French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man that "Men are born, and always continue free and equal in respect of their 
.. -.. '· 
rights" and that "The end of all political associations is the preservation ofthe natural 
and imprescriptible rights of man" (translated in O'Neill & Handley, 1994, pp. 8-9) are 
but two examples of the increasing affiliation with natural rights principles which was 
evident throughout the 18th century. When viewed objectively, it must be concluded 
that, irrespective of the truth of natural rights philosophy and its failure to consider the 
realities of social groups, classes and power elites, the natural rights doctrine was a 
powerful and influential politieal philosophy which inspired action on the part of a great 
many people (Boller, 1977). 
Bentham, one of the most outspoken early critics of natural right•. adhered to the 
view that only from 11real" (or positive) law could one acquire "real" rights. He tenned 
natural law "imaginary", claiming that, as such, it could spawn only imaginary rights 
which, rather than OOing imprescriptible as claimed, were the equivalent of "rhetorical 
nonsense, - nonsense upon stilts" (Bentham, 1843). From Bentham1s perspective, 
political obligation to such an untenable precept as natural rights was entirely 
unrealistic and could not create enough of an obligation on legal and political structures 
to act. Similarly, Sumner (1913, pp. 79-83) asserted that nature was more harsh than 
benign, that men were not born equal, and that human rights were not natumlly 
bestcwed, rather they were the product of civilisation. Legislatively limned positive law, 
in contrast to the metaphysical concepts of natural law and natural rights, was 
increasingly pmpounded as the only means through which rights could be attained and 
enforced: politicians such as Burke asserted that belief in natural rights implanted "false 
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ideas and vain expectations into men destined to travel the obscure walk of laborious 
life" (Burke, 1832, pp. 180-181 ), encouraging revolntionary action which posed a threat 
to the methods of compromise, employed by competing interests, which were necessary 
for the prosperity of civil society (Margolis, 1978). 
The rise of ntilitarianism in the 19th century - originally derived from the work of 
Bentham - challenged the legitimacy of natural rights doctrine. The utilitarian emphasis 
on maximising the greatest happiness for the greatest number, in contrast to the natural 
rights concern with tht' specific interests of individuals (Jones, 1994) was indicative of 
this changing political focus. Whereas the rights espoused in the 18th century were 
largely concerned with protecting the individual from arbitrary state powers, the 19th 
centwy saw the development of interest in socio-economic rights which were directed 
not only at the state (through claims for the provision of services and facilities), but also 
against other citizens (such as employee against employer). Western democmtic 
governments gradually began to recognise and accept a responsibility to address a 
variety of social and economic injustices at a societal level, particularly those pertaining 
to working conditions and exploitation of labour, public health, welfare and education 
(O'Neill & Handley, 1994, p. 10). In such instances, concern for the citizen acquired a 
collective, mther than individual, focus. Although there remained a feeling for 
individual rights, it became conceivable that the rights of the individual and the rights 
of society might, at times, be incompatible. Consequently, it became possible to view 
the rights of the individual as subservient to the wider needs of society as a whole. 
Here rests perhaps the most fundamental concern with the concept of natural rights. 
As suggested by Edwards (1996) there is an intuitive feeling that natural rights "are, or 
should be, absolute and indefeasible", yet one must question how these rights are to be 
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upheld if the interests of the individual to whom the rights must, of necessity, apply are 
not always held to be of paramount importance. Indeed, it is the notion of the 
indefeasibility of natural rights which has attracied some of the most vociferous, and 
the most enduring, criticism. In order to be absolute, rights must be have a solid 
conceptual foundation, the content of the right - and any correlative obligations - must 
be clearly delineated and there must be appropriate channels through which to seek 
redress for alleged breaches of rights. As the Australian Law Reform Commission has 
noted, "rights without remedies may be no more than rhetoric11 (cited in Evans, 1984; 
cf. Allen, 1990, p. 159): if a particular right cannot be claimed in practice it becomes 
difficult to substantiate it as a right per se. 
More recent theorists have endeavoured to explain and define the nature and 
content of rights in a marmer which facilitates their being upheld in the political arena. 
Although it is often suggested that rights necessarily correlate with duties, Hohfeld's 
(1919) classification of rights recognised that legally enforceable rights could take one 
of four forms: a claim, a privilege (or liberty), a power or an immunity. Claims pamllel 
the traditional narrow understanding of a right, whereby the right of one party is 
matched by an obligation or duty imposed on some other party. The liberty or privilege 
to undertake or participate in a particular activity exists provided, in so doing, no 
prohibition against such activity is broken (that is, there is no claim against the agent 
participating in such activity). A legal power is dependent upon a person's legal 
competence to perform an act which impacts upon another party (invoking the 
correlative oflegalliability), and a legal immunity arises when there is a disability (or, 
in Hohfeldian terms, a 11no-power11 ) on the part of othefs to do a particular thing 
(Hohfeld, 1919; cf. Martin, 1993, pp. 29-30). As a category, legal rights are defined by 
Wellman (1978, p. 369) as "institutional ... [being] created, defined and maintained by 
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the legal system in some society". As such, they are neither fixed nor, as a result, 
absolute: whenever circumstances require, they can be redefined by the prevailing legal 
system. 
Internationally, a proliferation of rights-based declarations, covenants and 
agreements have sought to put tbe issue of human rights squarely on the political 
agenda. Although it must be acknowledged that such covenants are not automatically 
legally enforceahle in specific jurisdictions, they provide a visible indication of the 
stated intent of the relevant signatories to uphold the rights contained therein. Tay 
(1986, p. 11) suggests that international human rights agreements should be more 
accurately viewed as indications of the direction the law should take: as redress through 
international courts of law is unlikely except for gross breaches of human rights 
agreements, there is a need for individual jurisdictions to enact appropriate (that is, 
supportive) legislation. Whilst this may be seen as a concession to the superiority of 
positive law, there is a tacit understanding that legislation should enhance, not override, 
the consideration of certain fundamental or natural rights. 
It is important to note that even many rights-based covenants in the natural rights 
tradition in effect quality the notion of "absolute" rights. For example, The United 
Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights acknowledges, in tbe 
preamble, the "equal and inalienable rights of all members of tbe human family". In 
Article 6, however, the "inherent right to life" shared by every human being is qualified 
by the injunction that "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life" [italics added]. 
Again in Article 9, the right to liberty is acknowledged "except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law". There is perhaps no more 
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concrete indication of the modem day realisation that even the so-called natuml rights 
are defeasible - not only in principle, but also, in prescribed circumstances, in practice. 
Protection of Rights in Australia 
Having established tha~ unless enacted positively in law, even the so-called natural 
rights are defeasible, it is necessary to identity the precise means through which human 
rights are protected in Australia. In practice, natural rights may be incorporated into a 
common law legal system by one of three means: through incorporation into the 
Constitution, in the meta-physical principles of the common law, or as statements of 
political aims for society (Edwards, 1996). Human rights protection in Australian 
society is, in varying degrees, dependent upon each of these. 
Constitutional rights have been championed as the highest order rights within our 
legal system (O'Neill & Handley, 1994, pp. 26-28). The Australian reality is, however, 
that constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights are remarkably few, raising concern 
as to the adequacy oflegal protection for individual rights in this country (Jones, 1994). 
It is widely accepted that explicit rights within the Australian Constitution are limited 
only to trial by jury (s. 80), freedom of religion (s. 116), acquisition of property (s. 51), 
voting rights (ss. 24 and 41 ), prohibition of discrimination against interstate residents 
(s. 117) and freedom of movement between the states (s. 92) (Jones, 1994; cf O'Neill 
& Handley, 1994, pp. 44-74). In framing the federal constitution, the incorporation of 
a Bill of Rights similar to that enacted by the United States was "consciously and 
deliberately rejected" (Tay, 1986, p. 18). Instead, there is a traditional acceptance in 
both legal and political spheres that the common law principles upon which Australian 
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law is founded are sufficient to ensure that citizens are entitled to "due process and 
equality before the law" (Fletcher, 1993). 
Jones (1994) suggP.sts that our common law inheritance was indicative of the 
prevailing "conservative" philosophy in 18th and 19th century Britain, whereby it was 
maintained that the only rights were those identifiable in the laws and customs of 
previous social orders. It was litis "inheritance of collective wisdom about rights" rather 
than the philosophy of natural rights, which drove Government policy: it was believed 
that "Common law precedents provided a stronger protection for individual liberties 
than abstract and ill-defined rights" (Jones, 1994). This perspective is not without its 
dissenters. Opponents contend that, although the common law has developed over 
numerous years on a case-by-case basis, it "has not developed general statements of 
principle which may be relied upon in the courts to protect human rights" (O'Neill & 
Handley, 1994, p. 85). Thus the ambiguity associated with the concept of rights- and 
more particularly, the enforcement of rights - has not been satisfactorily resolved. 
There are a number of concerns mised with regard to common law conceptions of 
the protection of individual rights. Perhaps most important is the inherent vulnerability 
of common law rights to abrogation or removal by statute law (Jones, 1994; O'Neill & 
Handley, 1994, p. 89). As noted previously, all legal rights are both created and 
maintained by a given legal system. If a specific aspect of common law tradition (or 
precedent) comes to be regarded as either obsolete or as insufficient to accommodate 
new situations or cases, the applicable rule may be redefined by legal institutions such 
as the courts or the legislature (Wellman, 1978). Where the legislature intervenes, 
citizens are left to take it 'on trust' that, in accordance with the notion of a responsible 
and representative government, individual rights will be upheld (Jones, 1994). This is 
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by no means guaranteed. There is virtually unlimited scope for the legal - that is, 
statutory - curtailment of common law rights unless such restriction is itself 
constitutionally forbidden (Jones, 1994). Furthermore, whilst the judiciary is perceived 
as the protector of individual rights through the application of the rule of law (Jones, 
1994), a "court cannot deny the validity of an exercise of a legislative power expressly 
granted merely on the ground that the law abrogates human rights and fundamental 
freedoms or trenches upon political rights which, in the court's opinion, should be 
preserved" (Brennan J, cited in Jones, 1994). 
The push for rights-based legislation has been a recurrent theme in modem political 
history. In 1973, a Human Rights Bill introduced by Senator Lionel Murphy- which 
sought to protect the rights contained in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights- was blocked in the Opposition-controlled Senate (Tay, 1986, p. 22). 
A second attempt to introduce federal legislation little more than a decade later also 
faltered when the Australian Bill of Rights 1985 was allowed to lapse. On this occasion, 
heated political and community debate focused on "the issue of States rights and the 
incursion of Commonwealth power into areas of State responsibility" (Fletcher, 1993) 
rather than on the proposed rights per se. Under our federal system, the power of the 
Commonwealth government to legislate for the nation as a whole is constitutionally 
limited: there is little provision for legislating in the human rights area, and attempts to 
justifY proposed legislation under sections such as 51(29)- "External Affairs"- the 
section which prompted debate in 1985/86, have been largely unsuccessful 
(Weeramantry, 1990, p. 240). It seems, therefore, a reasonable suggestion that the 
decision not to proceed with an Australian Bill of Rights was influenced by a perceived 
need to retain the limits applicable to Commonwealth power, mther than being 
necessarily indicative of public and I or political attitudes to human rights legislation 
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in geneml. This is perhaps reflected by the more recent (albeit limited) fedeml 
enactment of rights-based legislation mandating (among other things) anti-
discrimination and equal opportunity policies, areas which were conceivably 
inadequately protected under common law pmctice. 
Australia's fedeml government has also demonstrated a commitment to protection 
of human rights through its mtification of all major 20th centwy international 
declamtions of rights. Certainly, many of the fundamental rights proclaimed in 
documents such as the Universal Declamtion of Human Rights and the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights - for example, the concept of equality before the law, the right 
to a fair trial, and the presumption of innocence - are conceptions which have evolved 
in common law history and are, therefore, a pre-existent component of our lega1 
inheritance (Tay; 1986, p. 17). Thus it is thmugh both our common law heritage and the 
mtification of the mojor international human rights treaties that Australia has assumed 
an obligation to ensure that the rights contained therein are upheld within its boundaries 
(O'Neill & Handley, 1994, p. 113). Australia has also ratified the Optional Protocol of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which allows an individual 
claiming a violation of their specified rights, and having exhausted all available 
domestic remedies, to request investigation by the International Human Rights 
Committee. As with many issues under international law, however, the Committee's 
adjudication may be construed as only politically influential or per.;uasive mther than 
legally enforceable (Fletcher, 1993). Indeed, it has been suggested that the faith placed 
in international supervision is mther over-optimistic and we should instead be 
developing the means through which greater domestic scrutiny is fucilitated (Jones, 
1994). 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
That the right to a fair trial is of international concern is evident from most 20th 
centmy declarations of human rights. In 1948, the right to a fair trial was incorporated 
into the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 10), and has 
since been reiterated in Article 14 of the United Nations' International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. It is similarly acknowledged in various documents of more 
localised jurisdictions, such as Article 18 of the 1948 American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man and Article 6 of the 1966 European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
Pre~dating Australia's ratification of various international agreements, Mason 
(1995) states that, from our common law traditions, the right to a fair trial was already 
established as a central precept of our legal system. The necessary elements of a fair 
trial are, however, neither absolute nor immutable: the specification of these elements 
falls under the jurisdiction of the courts - and ultimately the High Court, which is 
Australia's final Court of Appeal (Mason, 1995). As part of the process of law reform 
generally, this process has been described as the "onward march to the unattainable end 
of perfect justice" (Jago v District Court [NSWJ [1989]168 CLR 23 per Brennan J at 
41 ), a statement which encapsulates the conviction that the judicial process, no matter 
how strictly regulated, cannot guarantee that all parties involved will perceive an 
equitable or 'fair' outcome. 
Uglow (n.d.) asserts that there are three aspects to legal fairness: the fairness of the 
rule, the fairness of the procedure, and the fairness of the decision. "The doctrine of 
sovereignty of Parliament meant that from the 17th centmy the courts would not 
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interfere in the substantive quality of a statute" (Uglow, n.d. ), thus the substantive 
nature of any given rule- and, as a ciJnsequence, responsibility for fairness of the rule -
must rest with the legislature. At this point it is pertinent to reitemte the concern, 
outlined previously, that the legislature does not always - or at least, of necessity - give 
adequate regard to individual rights. 
The pmctices relevant at the trial stage are those which are encompassed under the 
banner of procedural fairness. At common law, Uglow (n.d.) cites the elements of 
proceduml fairness as being: 
• the right for the defendant to be made aware of the nature of the charges and 
evidence against him or her 
• the right to legal representation 
• the presumption of innocence, which incorporates the right to silence and the 
burden of proof being placed on the prosecution 
• the applicable standard of proof being beyond reasonable doubt 
• the right to a public trial in a neutral forum 
• the right to cross-examine and test the prosecution evidence 
• the right to call evidence and give evidence on the accused's behalf 
• the right of appeal. 
From an analysis of a nwnber of docwnents, namely the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights, Harris (1967) identifies four categories to 
which the notion of filirness is applicable: the character of the court, the public nature 
of the hearing, the rights of the accused in conducting his or her defence, and a 
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miscellany of other single rules. He asserts that: courts must be established by law and 
must remain both independent and impartial; that, with few exceptions (such as the 
interests of justice, for reasons of public order, or for reasons of national security), the 
hearing must be conducted in public; that accused persons must be informed of the 
charge against them and must be given adequate time and facilities to prepare a 
defence; that the accused has the right to obtain legal representation, the right to cross-
examine witnesses, the right to obtain the attendance of and to examine witnesses on 
behalf of the defence, the right to be present at his or her bial, the rightto an interpreter, 
the right to freedom from self-incrimination and the right of appeal; and that the 
defendant must be afforded the presumption of innocence. 
Importantly, Harris ( 1967) acknowledges that "there are other il!definable 
characteristics of a fair bial. It is possible for all the rules which can be formulated with 
any precision to be observed and yet for the bial to be such that a fair hearing is not 
given". He offers as an example the need for the conduct of the court to be appropriately 
11 Serious". This concern was simiiarly voiced by Gaudron J (in Dietrich v The Queen, 
[1992]177CLR 292 at 70), who stated "the law recognises that sometimes, despite the 
best efforts of all concerned, a trial may be unfair even though construed sbictly in 
accordance with the law". Thus there is a sense that fairness and the law pertaining to 
legal practice are independent constructs which are not necessarily entirely compatible, 
a perspective supported by Gaudron J who recognises that there are various contexts in 
which the requirement of fairness is "independent from and additional to the 
requirement that a trial be conducted in accordance with law" (Dietrich v The Queen 
[1992]177 CLR 292 at 363). In overturning the original conviction in Dietrich, the High 
Court emphasised the right to a fair trial as a "fundamental prescript of the law of this 
counny" (per Deane J at 31) indicating that the defining characteristic of fairness must 
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be given primacy over other procedural concerns. It is apparent, therefore, that 
procedural objectives and legal pmctice must be developed and implemented in 
accordance with the right of the accused to a fair trial. 
Although Machan (1989, p. 63) claims that proponents of the natural rights 
tradition seek to explain human rights in a way which eliminates the possibility that 
specific rights can conflict either among each other for the one individual, or among 
each other between different individuals, this proposition is difficult to sustain. One of 
the principal concerns in the loosely defined nature of natural rights - the fact that the 
specific rights claimed under this doctrine differ between individual theorists on the 
basis of their conception of nature (O'Neill & Handley, 1994, p. 8)- is evidence of the 
difficulty involved in actually specifYing rights with any degree of certainty. Exhortation 
to legal rights does not. however, necessarily resolve this dilemma: evidence of 
conflicting goals, values and interests inherent in the legal system are commonplace in 
jurisprudential literature (Spader, 1984), whereby prioritisation of respective rights 
becomes a centrnl concern. There is perhaps no better example ofthis conflict than that 
between opposing parties in a criminal trial: 
Invariably invocation in a given case of the right to a fair trial generates 
an element of tension between the implementation of the right and some 
other competing interest~ for example. the public interest in securing the 
conviction of persons who have committed criminal offences. In that 
respect, the right to a fair trial may be compared with free-standing 
fundamental rights protected by a statute or constitution (Mason, 1995). 
The conflict created by competing interests in a criminal trial is not satisfactorily 
resolved by the various international human rights documents. This is particularly 
apparent in trials involving juveniles. For example, Article 14(1) of the United Nations 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that "any judgment rendered 
in a criminal case ... shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons 
otherwise requires"; Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights requires 
that all judgments be made public, however allows that "the Press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial ... where the interests of juvePJies or the protection 
of the private life of the parties so require". Although the protection of the interests of 
juveniles involved in criminal proceedings is a notable concern, an equally important 
consideration is the realisation that, in the enthusiasm to promote victims' rights 
(irrespective of whether or not the victim is a child), the legal system must not lose sight 
of the necessary regard for the rights of alleged offenders (Anderson, 1995). Thus the 
legitimacy of legislating to address the perceived needs of the child witness is not fully 
justified when the resultant legislation impacts upon the legitimate right of the 
defendant to a fair trial. 
Thomas Paine also argued that equality of rights is not necessarily matched with 
equality of powers: In a state of nature, some people will always be more able to 
achieve or exercise their rights than others. Additionally. there is no guarantee that even 
the strongest will necessarily be able to do as they please, "for their natural powers fall 
somewhat short oftheir natural wants" (cited in Boller, 1977). Associated with a lack 
of power is the concept of vulnerability: just as different groups in society hold more or 
less power than others, so too do different groups experience a greater or lesser degree 
of vulnerability than others. Children are acknowledged as particularly vulnerable by 
. virtue of their lack of autonomy and, in some cases, inability to speak for themselves 
(Sieber, 1992, p. 94). The particular vulnerability of the child is, indeed, acknov·: ::dged 
through the enactment of the particular legislation under investigation in this thesis, 
much of which is directed at enabling the child to give evidence more readily. 
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Interestingly, however, another classification of vulnerability relates to those who, for 
whatever reason, are deemed unlikely to attract public sympathy (Sieber, 1992, p. 93). 
It seems prudent to assume that defendants in (predominantly) child sexual abuse cases 
-upon whom the provisions of The Act impact- could be so classified. 
The resolution of conflicting interests in a trial situation is difficult. There is, 
however, a widespread acceptance that the right to a fair biallargely overrides other 
individual claims to rights within the context of the bial setting (Jones, 1990, p. 8; 
Uglow, n.d.). The conception of a fair trial is given priority over more 11pragmatic aims 
such as the determination of truth or law enforcement .... In the court, the accused's 
rights are pammount because the covert function of the trial is its concrete illustmtion 
of a fair and just society" (Uglow, n.d. ). The notion of fairness, extraneous to resolution 
of the dispute in question, highlights the fact that such resolution is not, of necessity, the 
ultimate goal of the court (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 538). Therefore, although attempts must 
be made to balance competing interests in a criminal bial, the defendant's right to a fair 
trial must be preserved as the definitive consideration. If an equal balance between the 
rights of the defendant and those of the victim can not be achieved, procedural fairness 
demands that the defendant receive any benefit of the imbalance. 
CHAPTER FOUR- IMPACT OF mE ACT ON mE RIGHT 
TO A FAIR TRIAL 
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Having briefly reviewed the philosophy pertaining to rights, the provisions for the 
protection of individual rights which are currently available within the Australian legal 
system, and the specific components of the individual right to a fair trial, the remainder 
of this thesis will provide an analysis of potential incompatibilities between The Act and 
defendants' rights. Specifically, this discussion will address the right to a fair trial, and 
the various provisions contained in The Act which impact upon this notion of fairness. 
Closed Circuit Television, Screening, and the Presumption of Innocence 
Australian criminal law dictates that, where allegations are made against an 
accused person, that person is held to be innocent until proven guilty (Cahill & O'Neill, 
1991, p. 103). Specifically, the presumption of innocence serves as a means of assigning 
the burden of proof to the prosecution (Morton & Hutchison, 1987, p. 14; Heydon, 
1984, p. 43). The prosecution must provide evidence of the guilt of the accused, and this 
evidence must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a conviction to be 
sustained (Morton & Hutchison, 1987, p. 2). 
It has been argued (Turner, 1994, p. 357) that, in cases of child sexual abuse, " ... 
the defendant starts out with a double advantage - there is not merely a presumption of 
innocence but a presumption that the crime is unthinkable. Most people, including 
jurors, do not want to believe that an adult is capable of sodomising a child". This view 
is supported by Dixon ( 1994b), who suggests that adults may find it attractive to assume 
that a child's allegations of sexual abuse are no more than fanciful imaginings, because 
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acceptance of such abuse as a reality is intolerable. She concludes that this abhorrence 
extends to jurors who, due to an unwillingness to accept that anyone could commit such 
a horrific crime, may be swayed by such suggestions should they be raised by the 
defence during the trial. She concludes that the ultimate outcome is an increased 
likelihood of acquittal. 
Conversely, it has been suggested that members of the public hsve a tendency to 
consider a person accused of a crime to be in fact guilty of that crime without 
necessarily giving adequate regard to the evidence of the case (Netteburg, 1987, p. 288), 
raising concern that the defendant actually starts out at a disadvantage. Additionally, 
rather than viewing children as inherently unreliable witnesses, it hss been suggested 
that juries might in fact be inclined to underestimate the ability of a child witness to lie 
(McGinley & Waye, 1988). This is perhaps even more likely when the alleged offence 
is one as emotive and distasteful as child sexual abuse: 
Recognising that the offender against children is almost universally 
despised within the general community should emphasise the need to 
ensure that a person who is merely the subject of an allegation of child 
abuse is given a fair hearing before they are 'branded' as a child molester. 
Because the crime is so seriously regarded a person in that position needs 
and deserves, if anything, a greater level of protection against being 
wrongfully convicted (Byrne, 1991, p. 8). 
From litis perspective, and in recognition of the fact that the defendant may commence 
the trial already at a disadvantage, "the presumption of innocence cautions the juty to 
put away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from arrest, the indictment, and 
the anaignmen~ and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal evidence adduced" 
(Morton & Hutchison, 1987, p. 3). 
37 
Irrebuttable or conclusive presumptions must be accepted by the courts absolutely, 
whereas persuasive presumptions are accepted until such time as the court is persuaded 
otherwise and evidential presumptions are accepted until credible evidence to the 
contrary is provided (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 315). "Facts may be presumed either as a 
general rule or only upon the establishing of other (basic) facts"- the presumption of 
innocence is an example of the fonner (Ligertwood, 1993, p. 315). 
Considerable evidence - both anecdotal and, to a lesser extent, empirical research -
indicates that one of the most stressful aspects oflegal proceedings for the child is being 
in the presence of the defendant (Whitcomb, Shapiro & Stellwagen, 1985; Flin, Davies 
& Tarrant, 1988; Cashmore, 1990; Spencer & Flin, 1990, pp. 229-231; Flin, 1990, p. 
278; ALRC, 1992, p. I; Goodman, Levine & Melton, 1992). Concern has been raised 
that the likely result of such stress or trauma is the inability of the child to provide 
satisfactory testimony- if indeed they are able to testity at all (ALRC, 1989, p. 4). 
Largely from this (and similar) evidence it is argued that there is a need to separate the 
child witness from the defendant throughout the trial, more particularly at the time the 
child is required to give evidence. If removed from the physical presence of the 
defendant, it is posited that the ensuing reduction in anxiety will facilitate the provision 
of more coherent, accurate and comprehensive testimony (Cashmore, 1990; Spencer & 
Flin, 1990, p. 83). 
In Western Australia, this recommendation has been acknowledged as being of 
sUfficient importance to warrant legislative amendment, and is dealt with under section 
106N of The Act permitting the use of closed circuit television or screening 
arrangements. Under these provisions, either: 
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• the child gives testimony from outside the courtroom, but from within the court 
precincts, and the testimony is transmitted to the court via closed circuit television 
- a practice which is also considered beneficial in that it removes the child from the 
"intimidating" atmosphere ofthe courtroom (Davies, 1993); or 
• the defendant is removed from the courtroom whilst the child gives evidence, 
however this evidence is transmitted to the defendant via closed circuit television; 
or 
• where closed circuit television is unavailable screening is utilised, ensuring that 
while the child cannot see the defendan~ the child remains visible to the Judge, the 
jury, the defendant and defence counsel. 
Although section I 06P of The Act specifically requires that where the use of closed 
circuit television or screening arrangements are employed the Judge is to instruct the 
jury that it is a routine pmctice and no inference as to the defendant1s guilt or innocence 
should be drawn from it, this practice is, at least potentially, problematic. The ability 
of the jury to overlook the obvious contradictions between the instruction and the 
practice of separation has not been substantiated with any degree of certainty (Cashmore 
& Cahill, 1990). This is a fimdamental concern because the ultimate effectiveness 
of the jury warning is most certainly dependent upon whether the jury perceive "that 
the procedure has been adopted because ofthe accused's presumed guil~ or because 
there are other significant considerations which make it desirable" (Szwarc, 1991, p. 
134 ). In separating the child witness from the defendant, there is a tacit 
acknowledgment that the child has reason to be hesitant in giving evidence in front of 
the accused. "The assumption that the fear is caused by having been abused by the 
defendant already assumes guilt and violates the presumption of innocence" 
(Underwager & Wakefield, 1992). Additionally, this assumption ignores the possibility 
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that any fear expressed by the child may reflect a variety of influences in the interim 
between making their accusation and delivering their testimony: in particular, "Fear may 
be learned from adults repeatedly telling a child that the accused has hurt them, is bad, 
wicked, should be punished, and is to be feared" (Underwager & Wakefield, 1992), 
rather than a genuine emotion based on past incidents of abuse perpetrated by the 
accused. Additionally, a witness who has knowingly made a false accusation is likely 
to be fearful of confronting the accused and giving testimony, thus the expression of 
fear must not be viewed as indicative of the guilt ofthe defendant (LRCWA, 1991, p. 
72). 
Furthermore, although anecdotal evidence provided by jurors suggests that they do 
not believe their ability to adjudicate on the basis ofthe evidence was affected by the 
use of closed circuit television (LRCW A, 1991) there appears to have been no direct 
empirical evaluation of the adequacy ofthejwy warning with regard to the presumption 
of innocence. Empirieal studies regarding the effect of closed circuit television on jurors 
decisions have produce no definitive findings (Cashmore, 1990). 
There are ways in which the erosion of the presumption of innocence can be 
minimised. The Austtalian Law Reform Commission (1989, p. 16) suggests that making 
either closed circuit television or screening arrangements a mandatory requirement 
reduces the likelihood of the jwy inferring guilt from the use of the procedure. This 
eliminates any potential bias associated with the procedure being deemed as warranted 
by the circumstances of a particular case. Accordingly, under section I 060 of The Ac~ 
the use of this procedure is mandatory in Western Australia for all Schedule 7 
proceedings unless specific application to give testimony in open court is made by the 
prosecution and approved by the presiding Judge. Cashmore ( 1990) further suggests that 
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the preferable mode of giving evidence is for the child to give evidence from outside 
the courtroom. She suggests that this can be explained to the jwy in terms of the 
intimidating nature of giving evidence in the courtroom generally, without specific 
refurence to the presence of the accused, whereas the removal of the defendant from the 
courtroom or the use of screens or partitions in the courtroom can only be explained in 
terms of the effect the accused may have on the child witness. For this reason, removing 
the child from the courtroom may be viewed as the less prejudicial alternative 
(Cashmore, 1990; cf. Szwarc, 1991, p. 136). This is also more consistent with the 
wording of section 635 of The Criminal Code [W A], whereby the defendant should be 
removed from the courtroom only if, by his or her conduct, they render continuation of 
the proceedings in their presence impmcticable. 
Thus it is argued that the Western Austmlian legislation is of concern: in order to 
minimise the impact of the use of closed circuit television on the presumption of 
innocence it is the child, rather than the defendant, who should be removed from the 
courtroom. This is not at present specified as the desired option in The Act. There is 
also a need to ensure that appropriate closed circuit television equipment is made 
available in all courtrooms as required to negate the need to use partitions, because 
whenever such partitions are used the presumption of innocence is, at least potentially, 
jeopardised. Although this would involve significant cost, it would appear necessary in 
order to ensure minimal erosion of the rights of the procedural rights ofthe defendant 
to a fair trial. 
The presumption of innocence does not purport to eliminate mistaken decisions 
because that is an impossible ideal, mther the aim is to ensure the elimination of 
mistaken convictions (Morton and Hutchison, 1987, pp. 4-5), acknowledging the fact 
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that the defendant must retain the benefit of any doubt. Although the need to minimise 
the trauma associated with giving evidence in open court, in the presence of the 
defendan~ is a credible concern, this need must be balanced with the right of the 
accused to a fuir trial. The presumption of innocence must remain intact until sufficient 
evidence to the contrary is adduced - and this presumption, rather than the protection 
of the child witness, must remain the fundamental focus of criminal proceedings 
(ALRC, 1989, p. 6). 
Right to Conduct Own Defence 
Traditionally, the defendant may either seek legal representation or choose to 
conduct their own defence. In recent times, much has been made of the right of. the 
defendant to procure legal representation. The Honorable Justice Mitchell of the 
Supreme Court of South Australia asserted that the right to be defended by duly 
qualified counsel was implicit in the recognition of the right to equality before the law 
(1975). In Dietrich v The Queen ([1992]177 CLR 292) the High Court of Australia 
determined that the court had a duty to ensure that the accused received a fair trial, and 
that in the case of an unrepresented accused facing serious charges - who had, in this 
instance, unsuccessfully sought legal representation through the Legal Aid Commission 
ofVictoria- the discretion of the court to stay or adjourn the trial in order to allow the 
defendant the necessary time to obtain representation should have been favourably 
exercised in order to ensure fuimess. Although the majority decision indicated that there 
is no absolute right to legal representation at public expense, there was an explicit 
acknowledgment that competent legal representation in serious criminal cases is highly 
-desirable. 
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Just as there is no absolute right to legal representation at public expense, there is 
no requirement that the defendant endeavour to obtain such representation. Under the 
amended legislation, however, the right of the defendant to conduct their own defence 
has been impinged upon by section I 06G of The Act, which mandates that an 
unrepresented defendant may not question the child witness directly, but must put their 
questions to the child through an intermediary- either the Judge or some other court-
approved person - who must then repeat the question accurately to the child. This 
requirement is not limited to Schedule 7 proceedings, rather it extends to proceedings 
for any offence where the defendant wishes to cross-examine a child under the age of 
16 years. 
As with the concerns raised regarding the use of screens and closed circuit 
television, this practice was promoted on the basis that the child would be likely to find 
cross-examination by an unrepresented accused particularly stressful (LRCW A, 1991, 
p. 94 ). Again there is a tacit acknowledgment that the child has reason to feel 
intimidated, an assumption which must certainly be viewed as prejudicial to the 
preswnption of innocence. If the defendant is allowed to cross-examine other witnesses 
but not the "affected" child, it becomes difficult to see any way in which this deviation 
from standard practice could be viewed by the jury except in terms of the effect the 
defendant would have on the child. Additionally, unlike the jury warning mandated 
when screens or closed circuit television are utilised, the legislation does not contain 
a similar requirement for a warning to be issued when questions are put to the child 
through an intermediary. Thus there is no attempt to moderate the impact of this 
procedure on the jury's perception of the innocence ofthe defendant, a situation which 
is, at least potentially, prejudicial to the accused. 
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Admissibility of Hearsay 
The rule against hearsay has been described as "undoubtedly the most important 
exclusionary rule in the law of evidence" (Waight and Williams, 1990, p. 643) 
governing, as it does, much of what may or may not he presented in court. This rule 
seeks to exclude the presentation of statements and assertions made by persons other 
than the witness who is testifYing, where the evidence is offered as proof of the truth of 
what is stated (Australian Law Reform Commission, 1982b, p. 3). If, however, the 
evidence is tendered solely for the purpose of establishing the fact that the statement 
was indeed made, it is deemed admissible, thus the important elements for 
consideration are the nature and source of the statement, and the purpose for which it 
is tendered (Hallen, 1988, pp. 41-42). 
Prior to the introduction of the Act, a number of exclusions to the rule against 
hearsay were in existence. some of which were of possible relevance in cases of alleged 
child sexual abuse. These included the doctrine of res gestae, whereby spontaneous 
utterances made by the child contemporaneous with (that is, either shortly before or 
after) the alleged assault were deemed admissible, as was evidence of a complaint 
"recently or promptly made by the victim of sexual assault" (Warner, 1991, p. 172), 
whether by a child or adult victim. The second of these exceptions did not extend 
admissibility to statements regarding other forms of physical abuse (LRCW A, 1991, p. 
37). Although it has been asserted that "The general approach to statutory reform of the 
law of hearsay in Australia has been extremely cautious" (Tapper, 1992) the scope of 
admissibility of hearsay evidence has been extended by the new legislation. Under 
section 106H of The Act, certain out of court statements deemed relevant to the 
proceeding, which were made by the child to another person prior to commencement 
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of the proceedings, are deemed admissible. "A relevant statement is defined as one 
which (a) relates to a matter in issue in the proceeding; and (b) was made by the child 
to another person before the proceedings commenced" (Dixon, 1994a). Thus there is 
now broad scope for hearsay evidence to be admitted. 
Warner ( 1991, p. 173) describes the traditional rule against hearsay as "irrational" 
in cases of child sexual abuse, because second-hand accounts may be more reliable than 
first-hand accounts due to the difficulties children experience in giving evidence. 
Additionally, she suggests that second-hand accounts are a necessuy inclusion where 
first-hand accounts are unavailable (for example, when the child is incompetent to 
testifY), a position supported by the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, 
which asserts that justifications for refonn are predominantly centred on the 
unavailability of other evidence (1991, p. 35). To enact change on this basis, however, 
must be viewed as precarious: exclusionary rules exist for a purpose, and to amend these 
rules merely to facilitate the reception of a particular form of evidence· ruther than as 
an acknowledgment that the grounds for exclusion are demonstrably false or 
inapplicable • sets a dangerous precedent. If, on the other hand, the grounds for 
exclusion are demonstrated to be invalid- a fact which has not been demonstrated in 
this instance · the rule should be amended or removed not only with regard to the 
evidence of children, but also for all other witnesses whose evidence is so excluded. 
The prejudicial impact of the admissibility of out-of-court statements has perhaps 
been minimised by the requirement that the child who was the original maker of the 
statement must be available for cross-examination by the defence (s. I 06H [I b)). This, 
however, negates the argument that a second-hand account should be admitted where 
a first-hand account is unavailable · the argument upon which the call for admissibility 
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of out-<>f-court statements was largely fouoded. If the child must be available for cross-
examination, the defence will have the opportuoity to demand a ftrst-hand accouot of 
the events in question - an opportuoity which would doubtless be acted upon. 
Video-recordings and the Confrontation and Eumination of Witnesses 
The rationale supporting the utilisation of video-taped evidence is a belief that, by 
allowing their evidence to be obtained and recorded at an earlier stage, the effects of 
delays in the trial process upon the ability of child witnesses to provide a clear and 
detailed accouot of their recollections will be minimised (Dixon, 1994a; Cashmore, 
1990). Although this is, once again, a credible concern, there are additional - albeit 
unintended - effects on the defendant. 
The use of video technology is addressed by sections 1061 - 106M of The Act, 
allowing for the admission - in Schedule 7 proceedings - of video-taped statements, 
video-recorded evidence in chief and/or video-recorded evidence taken at a pre-trial 
hearing. Applications uoderthese sections must be initiated by the prosecution (s. 1061 
(1]) and, in response, the Judge determines the procedure to be followed in taking the 
evidence, presenting the recording, and excising matters from the recording, as well as 
the manner in which any cross-examination or re-examination of the affected child is 
to be conducted at the trial (s. 106J). 
The use of video technology has been opposed on the basis that it interferes with 
the right of the defendant to confront prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court of 
California has outlined four objectives which the United States' Constitutional right to 
confront witnesses is intended to achieve, namely: 
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• to ensure that the evidence is presented under oath; 
• to ensure that the jury have the ability to assess the demeanour of the witness; 
• to facilitate direct face~to-face confrontation~ and 
• to provide the defendant with the opportunity to effectively cross-examine his or 
her accuser. 
(Bayardi, 1990) 
In response to these concerns, video technology does not affect the ability to detect 
whether the evidence is given on oath, provided that the taking of the oath (or 
affinnation) forms part of the recording. Similarly the demeanour of the witness can he 
assessed, as the witness must remain visible throughout the duration of the recording. 
This may, however, he affected where the technical quality of the recording is such that 
it distorts or fails to convey the appropriate tone of the evidence, affecting the ability 
of the jury to assess the credibility of the witness (Rayner, 1991, p. 63). The 
detennination of the extent to which the quality of the recording must he affected before 
it is deemed unsatisfactory remains arbitrary- firstly because there appears to have been 
no research conducted on this issue, and secondly because it is not specifically 
addressed under the current legislation. 
As has already been established, our Australian legal tradition does not recognise 
the absolute right to face-to-face confrontation of witnesses. Although the defendant is, 
in the normal court hearing, able to confront their accuser face-to-face, this has occurred 
in the absence oflegislation to the contrary mther than in recognition of a specific right 
to do so. This objection has no~ therefore, been considered defensible with regard to the 
provisions ofThe Act Interestingly, the right of the defendant to be present throughout 
the trial has been stipulated in international human rights agreements (for example, in 
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Article 14[4] of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), however these 
documents faJI short of providing an adequate definition of this requirement. The fact 
that the defendant's "presence" continues to be defined or interpreted differently in 
various jurisdictions is indicative of the ambiguous nature of this phrase. whereby 
Western Australia now deems the defendant to he present even when they are located 
in a specified area outside of the actual courtroom, a situation which is, at best, 
intuitively uncomfortable. 
Another concern lies with the ability of the defence to cross-examine the child 
witness effectively. This has, to a degree, been addressed by the amended legislation: 
because a video-taped statement does not substitute for the child's appearance at trial, 
the child must he available during the trial for cross-examination. Similarly, where the 
evidence-in--chief is video-recorded, the child must still be available in court for cross-
examination and re-examination. Alternatively, however, aJiowance has been made for 
the whole of a child's evidence to he taken at a special video-recorded pre-trial hearing, 
and for that video-recording to be presented in lieu of the child's appearance (s. 106K 
[4]). The pre-trial hearing may take place at any time prior to the trial, and is attended 
only by those persons whose presence is authorised by the Judge (s. 106K (I]). 
Defendants are held in a room separate from where the hearing is conducted, although 
they are able to observe the proceedings via closed circuit television. Thus they are 
forced to communicate with their legal representatives from a remote location. 
Furthermore, if they are unrepresented, they have to attempt to conduct their own 
defence from this location. Although they wiJI be provided with the means to 
communicate with a mediator in such circumstances, their level of control over their 
own cross-examination is, at least pntentially, affected. For example, research indicates 
that defence counsel who utilise closed circuit television to examine a child situated in 
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a remote location find this requirement less daunting as they gain experience (ALRC, 
1992, p. 142); unrepresented defendants do not receive the opportunity to gain such 
experience prior to their trials. Although the court-appointed mediator may be 
experienced in such procedures, they are constrained by Section 106G (b) of The Act 
to merely repeat the defendants questions to the witness. Whether these circumstances 
are sufficient to affect the defendants ability to cross-examine witnesses effectively is 
open to conjecture. 
A final objection is that The Act does not incorporate or mandate any explanation 
to the jury as to why the evidence of this particular witness (that is, the "affected" child) 
is being presented in a different format to that of other witnesses. Deviation from 
standard procedure allows speculation which, in itself, could be construed as potentially 
prejudicial. Warner (1988) states that conflicting views have been expressed as to 
whether presentation of evidence by video ~ whether this be a pre-recorded video or 
closed circuit television - actually increases or decreases the impact of the evidence on 
the jury (cf. Cashmore, 1990; ALRC, 1992, pp. 139-140). While she concludes that 
concern over the prejudicial impact of video evidence "merely reflects a mistrust of 
juries and is an insufficient reason for rejecting the procedure" (Warner, 1988), this 
represents an inappropriate disregard for a very legitimate concern. Although there is 
a lack of conclusive proof demonstrating that video-recorded evidence has a prejudicial 
impact on juries, this is an insufficient basis from which to defend the implementation 
of legislative reform. This is particularly so when there is a similar lack of proof to 
suggest that such evidence may be presented without inducing a prejudicial outcome. 
The effect of video evidence on the jury requires more detailed investigation.lfthe use 
of such technology can be demonstrated as in any way prejudicial to the interests of the 
accused, its utilisation must be re-evaluated. 
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While there are certainly less concerns where the videotape is presented in addition 
to the child giving evidence during the trial (Rayner, 1991, p. 63), any ensuing cross-
examination or re-examination would undoubtedly take place in accordance with the 
procedures allowing for the utilisation of closed circuit television and screening 
(outlined above), thus the objections raised with regard to these procedures remain 
relevant. Where the child is not made available at the trial for cross~examination, 
however, the recording becomes the sole means through which the jury evaluate the 
evidence of the child witness, effectively negating any opportunity to overcome the 
problems associated with video evidence. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCRIMINATORY ASPECTS OF THE LEGISLATION 
The concerns raised in the previous chapter are illusbative of the fact that The Act 
has had a significant impact on the trial procedure for specified offences. Although 
drafted with the need for procedural fairness in mind, The Act has, in some areas, 
redefined this notion of fairness with respect to the offences which fall under the scope 
of the legislation. Although many of the concerns outlined are not intended to 
demonstrate in themselves that the defendant no longer receives a fair trial, they 
exemplify a number of situations in which the defendant is subjected to potentially 
prejudicial treatment. Furthermore, when these individual concerns are grouped and 
reviewed together they provide strong evidence of inequality before the law. The Act 
has effectively ensured that, in trials where the provisions of the legislation are 
applicable, the rights of the defendant are construed differently than are the rights of the 
defendant in other cases. This overt inequality is certainly somewhat difficult to 
reconcile with the notion of fairness. 
Equality and Benign Discrimination 
Equality 11may be construed as consistency of practice relative to any political 
values" (Margolis, 1978). The principle of equality before the law is explicitly 
recogoised in both the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (Article 7) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14). Similarly, the 
Commonwealth Human Rights Commission expressly states that all people have the 
right to equal treatment under the law (Human Rights Commission, 1983, p. 2). 
Although, however, the concept of equality before the law is strongly embedded in 
Anglo-Australian legal tradition, the practical reality is that not all classes of people are 
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afforded equal treatment (Phillipps, 1987, p. 191). As explained by Evans (1974) the 
notion of equality is "rhetoric, not law. With the exception of a handful of federal 
constitutional provisions of limited scope prohibiting discrimination as between the 
States, there are no constraints on the ability of the Australian legislature to discriminate 
for or against whomsoever it pleases". Whether the legislature should hold such 
(virtually unlimited) power is questionable, particularly in light of the concerns, raised 
earlier, regarding the inadequacies of current accountability procedures for ensuring the 
legislature gives adequate regard to various human rights. 
There has been increasing international recognition tbat equality before the law 
does not necessarily result in equality in fact: to "obtain equality in fact, it may be 
necessary for some people to be given favourable treatment unavailable to others11 
(O'Neill & Handley, 1994, p. 387). This is described by Evans (1974) as "benign 
discrimination~~ - "the singling out by the state of a designated group for more 
favourable treatment than is accorded to others". He suggests that the fundamental 
concern with benign discrimination is how such treatment may be reconciled with the 
principle of equality. 
Justifications for benign discrimination are usually argned from the perspective that 
exact "like" treatment is unnecessary, rather "people should be treated alike to the extent 
that they are alike. Different treatment is appropriate when, but only when, there are 
relevant differences" (Evans, 1974 ). The introduction of this idea of "relevant 
differences", however, makes a .subjective evalUation of the need to apply either 
standard or preferential treatment to a givon class of person unavoidable. Two important 
questions this raises are: firstly, what criteria are to be employed in making this 
determination; and secondly, to what extent is it permissible to accept that, in seeking 
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to promote the equality of one group, the preferential treatment extended to that group 
impacts adversely on another? 
With this latter concern in mind, Evans ( 1974) suggests that opposition to benign 
discrimination arises from two sources. Firstly. the non-recipient of favourable 
treatment may object for reasons of prejudice, self-interest, or envy. With respect to the 
provisions of The Act, the non-recipient could be viewed as either the defendant upon 
whom the provisions impact, or other classes of witness who do not receive such 
preferential treatment. The second source of objection arises from people who have no 
direct or immediate involvement in the proceedings who may raise an objection, 
"founded on genuine egalitarian beliefs, that there is something wrong in principle about 
any program which treats persons other than exactly alike" (Evans, 1974). It is this 
perspective which emphasises the difficulties in reconciling the beneficial and 
prejudicial aspects of so-called "benign" discrimination. 
If, in accordance with the definition of equality offered by Margolis (above), the 
notion of a fair trial is construed as a political value, then the principle of equality 
would demand that the notion of fairness be consistently applied. Accordingly, 
procedural fairness, when viewed from the perspective of the defendant, would demand 
that defendants receive consistent treatment. Although intended to address the apparent 
difficulties and inequalities children face when they become involved in the legal 
process, The Act has achieved this at the expense of adequate considemtion of the 
defendanfs claims to equality. In extending preferential treatment to the child witness, 
the unavoidable consequence is that defendants become differentiated on the basis of 
their alleged offence: the procedure applied during the trial of the defendant charged, 
for example, with child sexual abuse is not consistent with that applied in a trial where 
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the provisions of The Act do not apply. Thus in this situation defendants affected by this 
legislation appear to have a legitimate objection - albeit based on self-interest - that, in 
relation to other defendants, they are not receiving equitable treatment. Perhaps the 
most disturbing aspect of such differentiation is that, at the time the procedural 
differences are applied, the guilt or innocence of the defendant has not been established. 
From this perspective, it is difficult to justifY why one defendant should not be afforded 
the same considemtion as another. This is a fundamental objection which should be of 
concern to anyone who perceives a need for procedural fairness to be founded on equal 
treatment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Balancing competing interests in a criminal trial is both a complex and contentious 
issue. When a child is involved as a witness in the trial process, the incompatibilities 
between the rights and needs of opposing parties are seemingly magnified The interests 
of justice, however, require that an appropriate balance be struck between these rights. 
As explained by Bates (1992), it is equally unacceptable either for unsubstantiated 
allegations of child abuse to be upheld, or for offenders not to be brought to justice for 
their actions. However, as Underwager (1989) asserts, whenever we endeavour to 
decrease the occurrence of a specified behaviour or outcome, there is an increased risk 
of "erring on the other side". Thus, if we focus on the introduction of measures to 
facilitate the successful conviction of child abusers, we may also increase the risk of 
wrongful conviction. For this reason, the rights of both victim and defendant must be 
adequately addressed. 
The psychological evidence upon which the provisions of the Acts Amendment 
(Evidence of Children and Others) Act /992 were based is compelling. Traditional 
beliefs regarding the inherent unreliability of children's evidence have been 
demonstrated to be unfounded, necessitating the reform oflegislation pertaining to the 
competency and corroboration requirements applied to child witnesses. To the extent 
that the provisions of The Act have addressed this issue, bringing children into line with 
other witnesses, there is no perceptible impact on the rights of the defendant. 
Certain provisions ofThe Act have, however, introduced procedural changes which 
are at least potentially prejudicial to the accused. These include the subtle erosion of the 
presumption of innocellce and a degree of interference with the ability of the defence 
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to cross-examine witnesses effectively. Furthermore, the legislation has resulted in the 
unequal treatment of accused persons involved in trials which fall under the scope of 
The Act when compared with accused persons facing other criminal charges. 
Differentiation on the basis of the defendanfs alleged offence is inconsistent with the 
concept of equality before the law, which is strongly embedded in Anglo-Australian 
legal tradition. 
Through our c,ommon law traditions, the right to a fair trial is established as a 
central precept of Austrnlia's legal system. In the Hohfeldian sense of a claim right, if 
a defendant has the right to a fair trial, then there is a corresponding duty placed on the 
legislators, administrators and practitioners - who have the ability to impact on and 
regulate the judicial process - to ensure that this right is upheld. Although laying claim 
to protecting the defendanfs right to a fair trial, The Act has focused exclusively on the 
needs of the child witness. Whilst based on legitimate concerns to minimise the trauma 
experienced by the child and to facilitate the reception of their evidence, the effect of 
the legislation has been a perceptible shift in the balance of competing interests in the 
criminal trial, whereby the interests of the defendant are not always adequately 
safeguarded. 
Although no single provision of The Act is necessarily sufficiently prejudicial to 
the accused to negate the right to a fair trial, when the provisions are considered in total 
there is a tangible effect on this right. This is incompatible with the understanding that 
the right to a fair trial, extraneous to the resolution of the dispute in question, holds 
priority over the pragmatic aim of the determination of troth (Uglow, n.d.; Ligertwood, 
1993, p. 538). Thus the discrimination inherent in The Act is most certainly not benign. 
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This thesis has emphasised the areas of potential incompatibility between The Act 
and defendants' rights. The extent to which this potential prejudicial effect engenders 
an actual prejudicial outcome has not been addressed. Thus future research must be 
conducted to explore the actual (not perceived) impact of The Act on all parties to the 
proceedings, including the defendant, the child, defence and prosecution lawyers, 
judicial officers and jurors. Subsequent to this investigation, a re-evaluation of the 
legitimacy of the legislation may be required. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX! 
Evidence Act 1906 (WA): Section 101 (Since repealed) 
101. (I) In any civil or criminal proceeding, or in any inquiry 
or examination in any court, or before any person acting judicially, 
where any child who has not attained the age of 12 years is tepdered 
as a witness and does not in the opinion of the court, or person 
acting judicially, understand the nature of an oath, the evidence of 
such child may be received, though not given upon oath, if in the 
opinion of the court, or person acting judicially, such child is 
possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the 
evidence, and understands the duty of speaking the truth. 
(2) No person shall be convicted of any crime or 
misdemeanour on the testimony of a child who gives evidence under 
the provisions of this section unless the testimony of such child is 
corroborated by other evidence in some material particular. 
(3) Any witness whose evidence has been admitted under 
this section shall be liable to indicttnent and punishment for peJjury 
in all respects as if he or she had been sworn. 
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APPENDIXl 
Acts Amendment (Evidence of Chadren and Others) Act 1992 (W A) 
Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children and 
Others) Act 1992 
PART 2- EVIDENCE ACT 1906 
[No. 36 
Principal Act 
3. In this Part the Evidence Act 1906* is referred to as the 
principal Act. 
[• Reprinted as at 14 August 1986. 
For subsequent amendments see 1990 Index to 
Legislation of Western Australia p. 52 and Act No. 15 
ofl991.] 
Section 35 amended 
4. Section 35 of the principal Act is amended by repealing 
subsection (2). 
Section 50 amended 
5. Section 50 of the principal Act is amended by repealing 
subsection (3). 
Section lOOA amended 
6. Section lOOA of the principal Act is amended by inserting 
after subsection (5) the following subsections -
• (6) References in this section to -
(a) a person who is tendered as a witnessj or 
(b) a person who desires to lay a complaint or 
information, 
extend to a child who is of or over the age of 12 years 
and who is tendered as a witness or who desires to lay 
72 
•. 3 
s..7 
No. 36] Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children and 
Others) Act 1992 
a complaint or information; and the provisions of thle 
section have effect accordingly. 
(7) Except ae provided in subsection (6), this 
section does not apply to a child, ae defined in section 
106A. 
Section 101 repealed 
7. Section 101 of the principal Act is repealed. 
Heading and sections 106A to 1068 inserted 
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• 
8. Atier section 106 of the principal Act, the following heading 
and sections are inserted -
" Evidence of Children and Special Witnesses 
Interpretation 
106A. 1n sections 106B to 1068 and in Schedule 7, 
unless the contrary intention appears -
"affected child" means -
(a) in relation to an application referred 
to in clause 2 of Part A of Schedule 7, 
the child In respect of whom the 
application is made; 
(b) in relation to any other Schedule 7 
proceeding, the child upon or in 
respect of whom it is alleged that an 
offence was committed, attempted or 
proposed; 
"child" means -
(a) aoy boy or girl under the age of 18 
years; 
Acts Amendment (Evidence of Childre~ and 
Others) Act 1992 
[No. 36 
(b) . in the absence of positive evidence as 
to ago, any boy or girl apparently 
under the ago of 18 years; and 
·(c) in any proceeding in the Children's 
Court, any boy or girl dealt with 
under section 19 (2) of the Children's 
Court of Western Australia Act 1988; 
"counsel" includes a solicitor; 
"defendant" -
(a) · in relation to an application referred 
to in clause 2 of Part A of 
Schedule 7-
(i) means any party to the 
proceeding, other than the 
affected child and an applicant 
who is a police officer or an 
officer of the Department for 
Community Services; 
(ii) in sections 106K (3) (e) and 
106N as they apply to such an 
application means any such 
party specified by the Judgo; 
(b) in relation to any other Schedule 7 
proceeding, a person complained 
against for an offence; 
"proceeding" means any civil or criminal 
proceeding or any examination in any 
Court or before any person acting 
judicially, and includes a preliminary 
hearing under the Justices Act 1902 and a 
pre-trial hearing under section 106K; 
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Others) Act 1992 
"prosecutor", . in relation to an application 
referred to in clause 2 of Part A of 
Schedule 7, means the applicant in that 
application; 
"Schedule 7 proceeding" means a proceeding 
that. comes within the provisions of 
Schedule 7; 
"trial", in relation to an application referred to 
in clause 2 of Part A of Schedule 7, means 
the hearing of that application; 
"video-taped recording" means any recording 
on any medium from which a moving image 
may be produced by any means, and 
includes the accompanying sound track. 
Sworn evidence of children 
106B. (1) A child who is under the age of 12 years 
may in any proceeding, if the child is competent under 
subsection (2), give evidence on oath under section 97 
(3) or after making a solemn aff'U'Dlation under section 
97 (4). . 
(2) A child who is under the age of 12 years is 
competent to take an oath or make a solemn 
affirmation if in the opinion of the Court or person 
acting judicially the child understands that -
(a) the giving of evidence is a serious 
matter; and 
(b) he or she in glVlng evidence has an 
obligation to tell.the truth that is over and 
above the ordinary duty to tell the truth. 
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Unsworn evidence of children 
106C. A child under the age of 12 years who is not 
competent to give evidence under section 106B may 
give evidence without taking any oath or making a 
solemn affirmation if the Court or person acting 
judicially forms the opinion, before the evidence is 
given, that the child is able to give an intelligible 
account of events which he or she has observed or 
experienced. 
Particular form of corroboration warning 
not to be given 
106D. In any proceeding on indictment for an 
offence in which evidence is given by a child, tbe 
Judge is not to warn the jury, or suggest to the jury in 
any way, that it is unsafe to convict on the 
uncorroborated evidence of that child because children 
are classified by the law as unreliable witnesses. 
Support for child witness 
106E. (1) A child who is under the age of 16 years 
is entitled, while he or she is giving evidence in any 
proceeding in a Court, to have near to him or her a 
person who may provide the child with support. 
(2) The person referred to in subsection (1) is to 
be approved by the Court and is not to be a person 
who is a witness in or a party to the proceeding. 
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Assistance in communicating questions and 
evidence 
106F. (1) Where a child under the age of 16 years 
is to give evidence in any proceeding in a Court, the 
Court may appoint a person that it considers suitable 
and competent to act as a communicator for the child. 
(2) The function of a person appointed under this 
section is, if requested by the Judge, to communicate 
and explain -
(a) to the child questions put to the child; and 
(b) to the Court, the evidence given by the 
child. 
(3) A person appointed under this section is to 
take an oath or make a declaration, in such form as 
the Court thinks fit, that he or she will faithfully 
perform his or her function under subsection (2). 
(4) A person appointed under this section who, 
while perfol1Iling or purportedly perfonning his or her 
function under subsection (2), wilfully makes any false 
or misleading statement to the child or to the Court 
commits. an indictable offence and is liable on 
conviction to imprisonment for 5 years. 
Cros~exam.ination by unrepresented defendant 
166G. Where in any proceeding for an offence a 
defendant who is not represented by counsel wishes to 
cross~examine a child who is under 16 years of age, 
the defendant -
(a) is not entitled to do so directlyi but 
(b) may put any question to the child by 
stating the question to the Judge or a 
person approved by the Court, 
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and that person is to repeat the question accurately to 
the child. 
Admission of child's statement in 
proceeding for sexual offences, etc. 
106H. (1) In any Schedule 7 proceeding, a 
relevant statement may, at the discretion of the 
Judge, be admitted in evidence if-
(a) there has been given to the defendant -
(i) a copy of the statement; or 
(ii) if the statement is not recorded in 
writing or electromcally, details of the 
statement; and 
(b) the defendant is given the opportunity to 
cross..examine the affected child. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not affect the operation 
of-
(a) section 106G; or 
(b) section 69 of the Justices Act 1902, other 
than subsection (1) of that section. 
(3) In subsection (1) "relevant statement" 
means a statement that -
(a) relates to any matter in issue in the 
proceeding; and 
(b) was made by the affected child to another 
person before the proceeding was 
commenced, · 
whether the statement is recorded in writing or 
electromcally or not. 
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Video-taping of child's evidence, 
application for directions 
1061. (1) Where any Schedule 7 proceeding has 
been commenced in a Court, the prosecutor may apply 
to a Judge of that Court for an ordar directing -
(a) that the affected child's evidence in chief be 
taken, in whole or in part, and :Presented to 
the Court in the form of a video-taped 
recording of oral evidence given by the 
affected child; or 
(b) that the affected child's evidence be taken 
at a pre-trial hearing. 
(2) The defendant is to be served with a copy of, 
and is entitled to be heard on, an application under 
subsection (1). 
Giving of evidence by video-tape 
106J. (1) A Judge who hears an application under 
section 1061 (1) (a) may make such order as the Judge 
thinks fit which may include directions as to -
(a) the procedure to be followed in the taking 
of the evidence, the presentation of the 
recording and the excision of matters from 
it; and 
(b) the manner in which any croas-examination 
or re-examination of the affected child is to 
be conducted at the trial. 
(2) An order under subsection (1) may be varied 
or revoked. 
• 
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106K. (1) . A Judge who hears an application under 
section 106I (1) (b) may make such order ss the Judge 
thinks fit which is to include directions ss to the 
persons who may be present at the pre-trial hearing. 
(2) An order under subsection (1) may be varied 
or revoked. 
(3) At a pre-trial hearing ordered under 
subsection(!)-
(a) no person other than a person authorized 
by the Judge under subsection (1) is to be 
present at the hearing; 
(b) subject to the control of the presiding 
Judge, the affected child is to give his or 
her evidence and be examined and cross-
examined; 
(c) except ss provided by this section, the 
usual rules of evidence apply; 
(d) the proceedings are to be recordod on video-
tape; 
(e) the defendant is to be in a room separate 
from the room in which the hearing is held 
but is to be capable of observing the 
proceedings by means of a closed circuit 
television system. 
(4) The affected child's evidence at the trial is to 
be given by the presentation to the Court of the 
recording made under subsection (3), and the affacted 
child need not be present at the trial. 
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(5) \Vhere circumstances eo require, more than 
one pre-trial hearing may he held under this section 
for the purpose of taking the evidence of the affected 
child, and section 1061 and this section are to be read 
with all changes necessary to give effect to any such 
requirement. 
Status of video-taped evidence 
106L. A presentation to a Court of video-taped 
evidence under section 106H, 106J or 106K is 
admissible as if the evidence were given orally in the 
proceeding in accordance with the usual rules and 
practice of that Court. 
Recording not to be altered without approval 
106M. (1) The original recording of video-taped 
evidence made at a pre-trial hearing under section 
106K for the purposes of a trial is not to he edited or 
altered in any way without the approval of a Judge 
before it is presented to the Court at the trial. 
(2) A video-taped recordiog that is edited or 
altered contrary to subsection (1) is inadmissible in 
evidence at the trial for which it was made. 
(3) In subsection (1) "Judge" means the Judge 
who presided at the pre-trial hearing or a Judge who 
has jurisdiction co-extensive with that Judge. 
Use of closed circuit television 
or screening arrangements 
106N. (1) This section -
(a) applies only to a Schedule 7 proceeding, but 
subject to any order under section 1060; 
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(b) is to operate only to the extent that the 
giving of evidence by the affected child is 
not provided for by an order under section 
106K; and 
(c) has effect notwithstanding section 635 of 
The Criminal Code. 
(2) Where the necessary facilities and equipment 
are available one of the following arrangements is to 
be made by the Judge for the giving of evidence by the 
affected child -
(a) he or she is to give evidence outside the 
courtroom but within the court precincts, 
and the evidence is to be transmitted to the 
courtroom by means of closed circuit 
televiaion; or 
(b) while he or she is g1vmg evidence the 
defendant is to be held in a room apart 
from the courtroom and the evidence is to 
be transmitted to that room by mesns of 
closed circuit television. 
(3) Where subsection (2) (b) applies the defendant 
is at all times to have the means of communicating 
with his or her counsel. 
(4) Where the necessary facilities and equipment 
referred to in subsection (2) are not available, a 
screen, one-way glass or other device is to be so placed 
in relation to the affected child while he or she is 
giving evidence that -
(a) the affected child cannot see the 
defendant; but 
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(b) the Judge, the jury (in the case of 
proceedings on indictment), the defendant 
and his or her counsel can see the affected 
child. 
Order that section 106N does not apply 
1060. (1) Where any Schedule 7 proceeding has 
been commenced in a Court the prosecutor may apply 
to a Judge of that Court for an order that section 
106N does not apply to those proceedings. 
(2) A Judge who hears an application under 
subsection (1) may grant the application if it is shown 
to the Judge's satisfaction that the affected child is 
able and wishes to give evidence iu the presence of the 
defendant in the courtroom or other room in which the 
proceedings are being held. 
(3) An order under subsection (2) may be varied 
or revoked. 
Instructions to be given to jury 
106P. Where in any proceeding on indictment 
evidence of an affected c:hild is given in a manner 
described in section 106N (2) or (4), the Judge is to 
instruct the jury that the procedure is a routine 
practice of the Court and that they should not draw 
any inference as to the defendant's guilt from the use 
of the procedure. 
83 
Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children and 
Others) Act 1992 
Identification of defendant 
[No, 36 
106Q, Where evidence of an affected child is given 
in a manner described io section 106N (2) or (4), and 
the identification of the defendant is an issue, the 
affected child is not to be required to be io the 
presence of the defendant for that purpose -
(a) for any longer than is necessary for that 
purpose; and 
(b) before the affected child's 
(including cross-examination 
examination) is completed. 
evidence 
and re-
Persons may¢ be declared special witnesses 
106R. (1) A Judge of a Court may make an 
order-
(a) declaring that a person who is giving, or is 
to give, evidence in any proceeding in that 
Court is a special witness; 
(b) directing that one or more of the 
arrangements referred to io subsection (4) 
are to be made for the giving of that 
evidence; and 
(c) providiog for any iocidental or related 
matter. 
(2) An order may be made under subsection (1) on 
application by a party to a proceediog, on notice to the 
other parties, or of the Court's own motion. 
(3) The grounds on which an order may be made 
are that if the person is not treated as a special 
witness he or she would, in the Court's opinion -
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(a) by read.on of mental or phyeical disability, 
be unlikely to be able to give evidence, or to 
give ~dence satisfactorily; or 
(b) be likely -
(i) to suffer severe emotional trauma; or 
(ii) to be so intimidated or distressed as 
to be unable to give evidence or to 
give evidence satisfactorily, 
by reason of age, cultural background, 
relationship to any party to the proceeding, 
the nature of the subject-matter of the 
evidence, or any other factor that the Court 
considers relevant. 
(4) The arrangements that may be made under 
this section are -
(a) that the person have near to him or her a 
peraon, approved by the Court, who may 
provide him or her with support; 
· (b) in any proceeding for an ofFence -
(i) that an arrangement of the kind 
described in section 106N (2) or (4) is 
to be made; and 
(ii) that the evidence be given at a pre-
trial hearing in the manner provided 
for by section 106K. 
(5) The Court may at any time vary or revoke an 
order in force under this section. 
(6) This section does not apply to an afFected 
child. 
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Pre-trial hearings to consider 
what orders should be made 
1068. (1) In any proceeding in which-
(a) the giving of evidence by a person; or 
(b) a matter affecting a person as a witness, 
is likely to require the making of an order or the 
giving of directions under sections 106E (2), 106F (1), 
106J, 106K, 1060, or 106R, the party who is to call 
that person as a witness is to apply for a pre-trial 
hearing for the purpose of having all such matters 
dealt with before the trial. 
(2) In subsection (1) "pre-trial hearing" in 
relation to a Court means a hearing provided for by 
rules of that Court for the purposes of this section. 
Section 119 amended 
9. Section 119 (2) of the principal Act is amended -
" 
(a) by deleting the full stop at the end of the subsection 
and substituting the following -
" ; and ";and 
(b) by inserting after paragraph (b) the following-
" (c) persons appointed under section 
106F. 
Schedule 7 added 
" 
10. After Schedule 6 to the principaJ Act, · the following 
Schedule is added -
APPENDIXJ 
Schedule 7 Offences 
s. 10 
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" SCHEDULE7 
(section 106A) 
PART A 
1. A proceeding comes within the provisions of tllls 
Schedule if-
(a) it is a proceeding in which a person stands 
charged with an offence under a section or 
Chapter of The Criminal Code mentioned in 
PartBorC-
(i) whether as a single offence or together 
with any other offence as an additional or 
alternative count; and 
(ii) whether or not the person is liable on the 
charge to be found guilty of any other 
offence; and 
(b) the affected child was under the age of 16 years 
on the day on which the complaint of the 
offence was made or, in the case of an 
indictment under section 579 of The Criminal 
Code, on the day on which the indictment was 
presented; and 
(c) · in the case of a proceeding for an offence 
mentioned in Part C, the defendant is a person 
to whom this paragraph applies. 
2. A proceeding also comes within the provisions of this 
Schedule if it is an application under section 30 of the 
Child Welfare Act 1947 for a declaration that a child is in 
need of care and protection. 
3, A proceeding also comes within the provisions of this 
Schedule if it is a procseding by way of appeal from a 
decision made, or a penalty imposed, in any proceeding that 
comes within clause 1 or 2. 
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4. Paragraph {c) of clause 1 applies to -
(a). a parent, step-parent, grandparent, step-
grandparent, brother, sister, step-brother, step· 
sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece of the 
complainant and a child of any uncle or aunt of 
the complainant; 
(b) a person who is or was, at the time when the 
offence was committed, living in the same 
household as the complainant; or 
(c) a person who at any time had the care of, or 
exercised authority over, the child in the 
household on a regular basis, 
and it is immaterial whether a relationship referred to in 
parag;raph (a) is of the whole blood or of the half blood. 
Chapter or 
Section 
181 
184 
186 
191 
192 
195 
XXXI 
PARTB 
Matter to which Chapter or section 
relates 
Carnal knowledge of animal 
Indecent practices between males in· 
public 
Occupier or owner allowing certain 
persons to be on premises for 
unlawful carnal knowledge 
Procuration 
Procuring person to have unlawful 
carnal knowledge by threats, fraud, 
or administering drugs 
Permitting boys to resort to 
brothels 
Sexual offences 
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PARTC 
Chapter or section Matter to which Chapter or 
section relates 
XXVIII 
292 
293 
294 
294A 
297 
296 
299 
300 
301 
302 
304 
306 
313 
317 
Homicide; suicide; concealment of 
birth 
Disabling in order to commit 
indictable offence 
Stupefying in order to commit 
indictable offence 
Acts intended to cause grievous 
bodily harm or prevent arrest 
Dangerous goods on aircraft 
Grievous bodily harm 
Causing explosion likely to 
endanger life 
Attempting to cause explosion 
likely to endanger life 
Maliciously administering poison 
with intent to harm 
Wounding and similar acts 
Failure to supply necessaries 
Endangering life of children by 
exposure 
Negligent acts causing harm 
Common assaults 
AssaUlts occasioning bodily harm 
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Chapter· or section 
318 
332 
333 
347 
Part C- continued 
Matter to which Chapter or 
section relates 
Serious assaults 
Kidnapping 
Deprivation of liberty 
Child stealing 
I 
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